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Appellant's Reply 
Appellee's counsel uses the Ray, Quinney, and Nebeker Motto of: always 
deny as much information as possible; then obtain as much information as is 
possible. 
Like the over zealous, and unethical prosecutor who must "win at all 
costs" in order to preserve his public image as "tough on crime"; the 
Appellee's counsel must "win at all costs" to preserve their "never lose to 
an employee" image in order to preserve their image for Utah business and 
industrial clients. 
May the Appeal Court Judges keep in mind, that completely fair and 
just adjudication is never possible when premature summary judgements are 
awarded. When discovery has been denied, issues cannot be clearly defined, 
and resolution of disputes is based on politics rather than judicial reasoning. 
Appellee's counsel has simply ignored the issues clearly raised in 
Appellant's Brief, page 5. 
1. Appellant's First Issue Asks on page 5 of Appellant's Brief: 
"Can Utah employers assign an employee to 
accomplish tasks and responsibilities the same 
as other employees who are paid at a much 
higher grade and pay?" 
Appellee's answers, on page 7, of Appellee's brief: 
"Has Plaintiff raised any valid appellate issues 
arising from the summary judgment motions 
granted by Judge Glasmann and Judge Dutson?" 
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Does the Appeal Court permit question in lieu of answers? 
2. Appellant's Second Issue asks on page 5 of Appellant's Brief: 
"Can Utah employers claiming 
protection under "Employment at Will" falsely 
accuse an employee of a criminal act, terminate 
the employee based upon the accusation, 
damage the employee's current and future 
employment potential, but never permit the 
employee to question or challenge the false 
allegation?" 
Appellee's answer on page 8, of Appellee's Brief: 
" If this court were to find that Plaintiff has 
raised any issues arising from the summary 
judgment motion, did Plaintiff satisfy her 
burden of avoiding summary judgment by 
coming forward with specific, admissible, 
evidence showing that there were genuine 
disputes of material facts such that 
summary judgment was not appropriate?" 
When the Court denied Plaintiff's Attorney discovery when new 
evidence information become know to him, he and his client suffered 
serious discretionary abuse. 
3. Appellant's Third Issue asks on page 6, of Appellant's Brief: 
" Can an assigned Judge, who replaces a Judge 
removed from the Bench for gross misconduct, 
refuse to consider rulings by the former Judge?" 
Appellee's answer on page 8, of Appellee's Brief: 
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(Appellee makes no attempt to answer Plaintiff's 
Third Issue, at all) 
When Judge Dutson refused to consider Judge Glasmann's Rulings, it 
was before Judge Glasmann was removed from the Bench. However. 
Judge Dutson. without doubt, had been covering-up for Judge 
Glasmann's misconduct for years. Forcing a ruling made bv a 
knowingly compromised Judge was unfair, injudicious, discretionary 
abuse. 
4. Appellant's following Reply is directed to specific statements 
found in Appellee's Brief: 
a. Appellee states on page 7 of Appellee's Brief, under 
Jurisdiction: 
" . . . [Plaintiff] raises in her brief, appear to address 
issues decided in a separate case she brought against Autoiiv ASP, Inc. 
("Autoiiv") in Federal Court." 
Appellant's Reply. Appellee's counsel tries to distort case 
perception and history by confusing Title VII Civil Rights discrimination 
charges with the state charges that were filed by the Appellant, Pro 
se, several months before the federal case was filed. 
Appellant/Plaintiff received a Right To Sue letter from the 
EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) in April of 1998, 
over a month after her suit had been filed in the Second District Court. 
The Federal Suit, Title VII , discrimination complaint, had to be filed in 
Federal Court within 90 days. It was filed by Appellant on June 29, 
1998, when Mr. John Caine, agreed to represent her in this State Case 
only. 
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Plaintiff was advised by her attorney Mr. Caine and others 
that she must file the civil rights discrimination case in the Federal 
District Court, and that it was not within the jurisdiction of the state 
court. This is confirmed by Mr. Caine in exhibit #40, of Appellant's 
Addendum, and in court record. (R. 851-863) 
Mr. Caine's office inadvertently separated and filed his 
pleading Reply To Defendants Motion In Opposition, from the exhibits in 
support of the pleading. These were inadvertently filed on 7 August, 
2000. (R, 790-850) 
Until the Defendants counsel used excerpts from the 
federal case depositions, Mr. Caine was unaware of the facts that took 
place during Plaintiffs employment prior to her termination. When he 
did become aware of such facts, he ask for court reporter's deposition 
copy. This had, however, been withheld due to defendants counsel 
instructions to the court reporter on the payments of costs. These 
costs at the time were beyond the plaintiffs financial capabilities. (R. 
791-795) (Exh. #40) 
b. Appellee states on page 7 of Appellee's Brief. "These claims 
and issues were never a part of the State's action that is presumably 
the subject of this appeal. New claims or issues cannot be raised on 
appeal." 
Appellant's Reply: These are not new issues, they are just 
issues that were not made known to the Plaintiffs attorney, who was 
retained several months after the Plaintiff had filed her complaint in 
the Second District Court. 
When the Right To Sue letter was received by Plaintiff, she 
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and her attorney separated those claims he thought were State 
claims, and those that he felt were Federal Civil Rights claims. 
These were not new claims at all. They were claims for 
which he was un-aware until defendant's counsel mentioned them in 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment in this State case. These 
were not Title VII, Civil Rights, complaint claims. 
For example: the employer, Autoliv Inc. falsely accused 
Plaintiff of the criminal act of "fraud and misrepresentation of hours 
worked," (Appellant's Brief, Add. Exh. #23) 
Because Autoliv Inc. Has no ADR (Administrative Dispute 
Resolution) program, Plaintiff was not permitted to challenge the 
accusation, face her accusers, or examine them under oath. Plaintiff 
was denied adjudication of such career damaging accusations. 
Accusations of fraud and misrepresentation in her career field was 
devastating. The federal.Title VII suit and claim, was based on Plaintiff 
being subjected to discriminatory treatment due to her gender and her 
national origin. 
The Plaintiff filed her original complaint in the Second 
District Court as a pro se litigant. As such, the court ignored her 
pleadings. Her efforts to obtain discovery were ignored. At the same 
time, she was over burdened with interrogatory requests, some 97 in 
number. (R. 124- 143) 
When she appealed to the court to compel discovery, and 
relief from a 97 question interrogatory, the court ignored her 
pleadings. As a result, when her attorney took over the case, he was 
unable to obtain data that should have been included in the record. 
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(R. 153-156) 
Defendant's counsel, represented Autoliv in both the 
federal and state cases. They were privy to all of the data that had 
been accumulated for both the State and the Federal Courts. This 
information was unknown to the Plaintiff's attorney until such time as 
Defendant's counsel used deposition extracts from the federal case in 
their Motion for Summary Judgment in this State case. It was the 
Defendant's use of the information in their Motion for Summary 
Judgment that brought it to the Plaintiff's attorney's attention, and 
legally into the State case litigation. The Court allowed Defendant's 
counsel to use such federal case information; but when Plaintiff's 
Attorney wanted to use information from the same federal case 
transcripts, and to take depositions of Autoliv defendants, the court 
refused. This was an abuse of discretion, and totally unfair to 
Plaintiff. 
c. Appellee states on page 22 of Appellee's Brief: "Although 
Plaintiff was represented throughout the state action, she is pursuing 
this appeal pro se, " A s a general rule, a party who represents 
himself will be held to the same standards of knowledge, and practice 
as a qualified member of the bar. . . ." 
Appellant's Reply: Appellee's statement is incorrect. Defendant 
counsel knows that Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on March 2, 1998, acting 
in her own behalf, pro se. She was not represented by counsel until 
June 22, 1998. Between March 2, 1998, and June 22, 1998, Plaintiff 
was unable to obtain discovery, and unable to get the court to act on 
her pleadings, including Motion to Compel Discovery, and for Protective 
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Order. (R. 73-95 and, R. 124-143 and, 144-152) 
Then, after having been told that Title VII, Employment 
Discrimination Complaints must be filed in Federal District Court, Mr. 
Caine agreed to represent her only in this State Defamation case. 
While, Appellee mentions requirement for pro se litigants to meet 
standards for Bar members, the Court should also recognize that Bar 
members should extend Pro se's litigants the same courtesy and 
procedurally correct treatment as they do other Bar members. And 
the goal of the courts should be to provide fairness and justice, and 
not just Bar member's welfare. Everyone knows that Judges are 
lawyers. And any reasonable person knows that a pro se litigant faces 
an extreme handicap. Whenever Judges must be reminded of their 
professional affiliation, by large law firm lawyers, there is reason to 
suspect their honesty. 
Defendant's counsel created every kind of expense for an 
unemployed pro se litigant, faced with sudden financial difficulties that 
were heaped upon her and her family as a result of malicious, false 
accusations and inconsiderate actions. 
Not long after Attorney Caine took over this State case, Plaintiff 
was advised that Mr. Caine may not be trustworthy. Mr. John Morris 
a legal representative for Defendants in the Federal case advised 
Plaintiff's in-laws that a deal had been arranged between Mr. Caine and 
Defendant's lead legal counsel. Mr. Caine denied the allegation, and Mr. 
Morris left the Defendant's law firm. (See Exh. # 2 1 , para. 5, of 
Appellant's Brief Addendum) 
It should be noted in exhibit #21 , an effort was made to obtain 
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the audio tape recordings of the discussions of the court with the 
parties. Judge Glasmann had not made such tape recordings of such 
discussions, which was in violation of the Utah Rules Of Procedure, 
4-106, Rules of Judicial Administration. 
d. The Appellees' states on page 11 of Appellee's Brief: "That 
on October 12, 1999, the federal lawsuit was dismissed in its entirety 
on summary judgment by federal district Judge, Dale A. Kimball." 
Appellant's Reply: As all honest legal professionals know, there 
can be no fair, impartial, and complete adjudication when only one side 
has been permitted to obtain discovery. Such professionals know that 
issues still in dispute must be resolved before summary judgment is 
appropriate. Defendant's counsel, with the support of tainted Judges, 
has eliminated this concept and has openly violates FRCP Rule 56, 
which parallels URCP Rule 56. 
An example of this summary judgment abuse was illustrated in 
Judge Kimball's Memorandum Opinion and Order of October 12, 1999. 
Judge Kimball states in footnote 3, page 5, "According to the 
Defendants, this video tape does not exist." This statement, 
compared to transcript of proceeding on September 1, 1999, Plaintiff 
Eddy, on page 1 6, lines 21-25, and on page 17, lines 1 -4, and on page 
19, lines 1-9, clearly described the secret video taping that had taken 
place. THIS TAPE IS AVAILABLE AND ALWAYS HAS BEEN. The issue 
was still in dispute and should have prevented summary judgment. 
Another example of Judge Kimball's prejudice against pro se 
litigants is described on page 2, of Memorandum Opinion and Order. 
Judge Kimball states: "Defendants determined that she [Christina 
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Eddy] was not qualified for this job." But then on page 26, lines 24-25, 
of the transcript, Judge Kimball asks Defendants counsel: "why did 
they give her a trial run on the job if she wasn't qualified for it?" 
Again, an issue that was still in dispute was ignored and summary 
judgment was awarded. 
e. Appellee states on page 8 of Appellee's Brief: "Plaintiff must 
marshall her evidence by setting forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issues for trial, and these facts must be supported 
by the record and constitute admissible evidence." 
Appellant's Reply: Defendants counsel selected pages from 
federal case depositions that supported their case, but omitted pages 
that clearly supported Plaintiffs case. These federal case depositions 
were not available to Plaintiff's Attorney in the State case. Like 
politicians in a political campaign, Defense counsel selects bits and 
pieces, distorts the total picture, and then declares only those that 
favor them. The issues that have been identified in Appellant's Brief, 
are supported by documented evidence. Much of this evidence is 
available in Appellant's Appeal Brief, and can be seen in the Brief 
Addendum. Unless, and until, this evidence can be disputed through 
under oath testimony, it must be assumed best evidence and accepted 
as valid. 
f. Appellee states on page 42. foot note #25. of Appellee's 
Brief: that "Plaintiffs Federal Deposition was actually taken in March 
and April of 1999." 
Appellant's Reply: The Appellee's statement is an example of 
how distortion, half-truths, and obfuscation used by Defendant's 
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Counsel. Plaintiff and her husband were subjected to hour upon hour of 
depositions for both the Federal case and the State Cases. Their 
depositions for the federal case were taken on January 27, 1999, 
January 28, 1999, and April 23, 1999; and for State case on, July 20, 
1998 and November 20, 1998. Plaintiff was not permitted to take 
even one deposition of the five defendants in the federal case. 
Plaintiff's attorney was permitted to take one deposition in this State 
case, and that took place after nine schedule date changes by 
Defendant's counsel. It is totally unfair for Defendant's counsel to use 
deposition information obtained in another court, and then deny 
Plaintiff's counsel to use information from the same depositions. 
It is important to note that Defendant's counsel tries to make it 
appear that depositions were not taken on January 27, and 28, but 
"was actually taken in March and April 23, 1999." The reason for this 
intentional and misleading statement is because Defendant's counsel 
does not wish the court to study Plaintiffs inclusion of January 27, 
and 28, 1999 deposition excerpts that prove the deceit of Autoliv's 
counsel. (Add. Exh. 4 1 , of Appellant's Brief.) 
Appellant's attorney, Caine, stated in the record that he had not 
seen Plaintiffs federal case deposition because it was not available to 
him. This point was clearly made in Attorney Caine's, Plaintiff's Reply 
To Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition filed with the Court on 
August 4, 2000, (R. 851 - 863) with Exhibit 40 and R. 764 - 863) 
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CONCLUSIONS 
APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF has been subjected to a variety 
of malicious, false, deceitful, and defamatory employment 
practices. 
APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF was maliciously accused of a 
criminal acts of fraud and misrepresentation, but was never 
given opportunity to challenge the accusations with 
documented evidence. 
APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF was subjected to more 
unsubstantiated and maliciously false statements in the 
employer's efforts to deny her unemployment compensation. 
APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF was denied fair adjudication by 
the Second District Court which refused her motions to 
compel discovery, and to relieve excess discovery demands 
placed upon her. 
APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF was subjected to rulings by a 
compromised Judge who was not worthy of seat on the 
Bench, and was in fact removed from the Bench. 
APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF was forced to accept rulings by 
a Judge who would not review prior rulings, and who knowingly 
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covered-up the removed Judge's misconduct. 
APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF has been subjected to Utah 
Courts that are totally prejudiced against employees and 
particularly those who must represent themselves pro se. 
THEREFORE: The Appeal Court is requested to return some 
measure of fair adjudication by reverse and remand of this 
case with instructions to reopen discovery, and then proceed 
through the jury trial that was requested when the complaint 
was filed, and paid for. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED 
Plaintiff request Oral Argument as authorized by Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Rule 29. Appellant/Plaintiff has placed her trust 
in Utah Court's fair adjudication, realizing that legally trained attorneys 
have a distinct advantage over Pro se litigants. However, she is 
convinced that much of the distortion and unfairness of prior 
proceedings would have been prevented if she had the opportunity to 
answer Court questions based on first hand knowledge, and honesty. 
Dated this JLZ. day of June 2002. 
Christina M. Eddy 
5011 S. 7500 W. 
Hooper, Utah 84315 
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I, Renee B. Eddy hereby certify that I hand delivered two copies 
of the Appellant's Reply Brief, to Attorneys below on £L'^ay of Julfife-
2002, to: 
Janet Hugie Smith 
Rick Thaler 
Ray, Quinney, and Nebeker 
36 South State Street 
Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Renee B. Eady 
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